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Abstract 
A key component of economic decisions is the integration of information about reward 
outcomes and probabilities in selecting between competing options. In many species, risky 
choice is influenced by the magnitude of available outcomes, probability of success, and the 
possibility of extreme outcomes. Chimpanzees are generally regarded to be risk seeking. In 
this study we examined two aspects of chimpanzees’ risk preferences: First, whether setting 
the value of the non-preferred outcome of a risky option to zero changes chimpanzees’ risk 
preferences, and second, whether individual risk preferences are stable across two different 
measures. Across two experiments, we found chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes, n = 23) as a group 
to be risk-neutral to risk-avoidant with highly stable individual risk preferences. We discuss 
how the possibility of going empty-handed might reduce chimpanzees’ risk seeking relative to 
previous studies. This malleability in risk preferences as a function of experimental parameters 
and individual differences raises interesting questions about whether it is appropriate or helpful 
to categorize a species as a whole as risk-seeking or risk-avoidant.  
 
Keywords: chimpanzees, risk, individual differences, zero-outcome  
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Introduction 
Decisions under risk and uncertainty are a ubiquitous part of both human and animal lives, 
ranging from complex monetary investment decisions in humans to decisions about where and 
when to forage or how to pursue mating efforts for most other animals. Risky choice is shaped 
by a number of contextual factors, including the magnitude of available outcomes (i.e., the size 
or quantity of rewards (1-3)), outcome delays (4-6), choice framing (i.e., whether outcomes are 
presented as potential gains or losses), the probability of winning or losing a gamble (7-9), 
social context (for example, playful vs. competitive scenarios (10) or bystander vs. alone 
scenarios (11)), and how information is obtained (i.e., via learning-by-description vs. learning-
by-experience (3, 12)).  
Studying decision-making under uncertainty in nonhuman primates, especially other great 
apes, may be particularly relevant for understanding the evolutionary roots of human decision-
making. Such comparative approaches inform hypotheses about whether human risk 
preferences are related to uniquely human attributes or can be explained by shared and more 
general cognitive abilities. For example, this approach can provide insights into decision-
making biases that may seem irrational at first sight, but actually convey fitness benefits when 
considering the ecological and other contextual factors in which decisions take place (13-15).  
A number of studies have looked at great apes’ responses to risk and uncertainty (10, 16-18). 
For example, Haun and colleagues (16) presented all four species of great apes with a setup 
where subjects could choose between a safe reward option (a small piece of banana, which they 
saw the experimenter put under the “safe cup”) and a risky option, which consisted of a variable 
number of “risky cups” that could potentially contain a larger piece of banana (the experimenter 
hid one larger piece under one of 1, 2, 3, or 4 risky cups behind a visual barrier out of sight of 
the subjects). They found that great apes adaptively adjusted their risk-taking strategy, 
choosing the safe option more frequently as the reward size of the safe option relative to the 
risky option increased and as the probability of success of the risky option decreased. In 
addition, chimpanzees and orangutans were generally risk seeking, whereas bonobos were 
more risk averse.  
Several other studies presented chimpanzees and bonobos with a two-cup choice paradigm to 
assess risk preference. In these studies, one cup yielded a consistent safe reward (for example, 
a medium amount of food or one piece of a medium-preferred type of food), whereas the other 
cup yielded a worse or better outcome with a 50/50 chance (10, 17-19). These studies 
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consistently found that chimpanzees were risk seeking overall, choosing the variable reward 
option, whereas bonobos went for the safe option more often. This divergence is somewhat 
surprising because the two species are closely related and have similar cognitive abilities (20). 
One prominent ultimate-level explanation for such species differences in risk tolerance under 
similar conditions points to differences in their natural feeding ecologies (13, 14, 19, 21, 22). 
Reliance on naturally abundant and reliable food sources may allow animals to avoid risky 
foraging strategies and lead to generally risk-averse choices. In contrast, a more unpredictable 
and patchy feeding ecology may force animals to engage in risky foraging which in turn might 
shift their cognitive strategies towards risk seeking in general. The reported differences in risk 
preferences between chimpanzees and bonobos fit this pattern, with chimpanzees facing a more 
unpredictable feeding ecology than bonobos under natural conditions (e.g., 19).  
In humans, risky choice is often modulated by the magnitude of the extreme outcomes - the 
largest and smallest rewards encountered in a choice situation (7, 9, 19). One key finding is 
that people overweight extreme outcomes in both memory and choice (3): they choose as if 
they attribute a higher probability to the values at the high and low edges (i.e., the extremes) 
of the experienced range of outcomes. For example, study participants judge extreme outcomes 
to have occurred more often than moderate outcomes (when in fact they had been presented 
equally often). When making experience-based decisions, participants expressed more risk 
seeking for gains than losses, and this pattern was dependent on the relative range of the 
experienced values – people made more risky choices when presented with a set of high-value 
gain decisions (e.g. fixed +60 versus risky +40/+80) than when presented with a set of low-
value gain decisions (e.g. fixed +20 versus risky 0/+40) (for an overview, see 3).  
Interestingly, pigeons behaved according to predictions of this extreme-outcome rule as well 
(2). Recent findings, however, indicate that pigeons might particularly avoid zero outcomes 
rather than overweight extreme outcomes in general, whereas humans treat zero outcomes like 
other extreme small outcomes (1). Pisklak and colleagues (1) propose that pigeons treat a risky 
option with the possibility of zero outcome as an option that sometimes yields a delayed reward 
rather than as an option with the possibility of a zero outcome. In delay discounting tasks, 
subjective reward value decreases rapidly for pigeons (23-25), which might explain their 
avoidance of zero-outcome options: they avoid the possibility of having to wait for their 
reward. In contrast, reward value decreases more slowly for great apes, including humans, and 
they can wait longer for “larger-later” outcomes (25-27).  
5 
 
To our knowledge, neither the outsized impact of extreme outcomes in relation to the presented 
range of possible outcomes nor a zero-avoidance effect have been systematically tested in 
nonhuman primates. Nearly all of the previous risk-taking studies with chimpanzees used small 
amounts (e.g. only 1 piece of food) as the unlucky outcome. We know of only one study with 
chimpanzees where the variable (i.e. more “risky”) option sometimes yielded a zero outcome: 
Proctor et al. (28) devised a nonhuman primate version of the “Iowa Gambling Task”-- a 
standard task in psychology to study decision-making in humans—with additional conditions 
to disentangle reward maximization and risk avoidance. In one condition where both options 
yielded the same average payoff, chimpanzees were risk-avoidant on average. Chimpanzees’ 
avoidance of the more variable option may have been related to the possibility of getting 
nothing in a few cases (risk of zero was 10% for the high-variance stack) or may be the result 
of differences in experimental procedures compared to previous studies (for example, having 
two static stacks of pre-baited cups to choose from, as in the Primate Gambling Task, is 
different from having an experimenter set up and re-bait two cups repeatedly for each choice 
trial). In any case, this finding provides an interesting first indication that the possibility of 
getting nothing might elicit different responses, namely playing it safer, than small-reward 
gambles in chimpanzees.  
Despite chimpanzees’ ability to delay gratification and control their impulsivity to point at 
“smaller-sooner” options, outcomes yielding zero might have a special standing for them, 
considering chimpanzees have evolved in a risky feeding ecology. While risk seeking might 
maximize chimpanzees’ survival chances in most situations (19), it might be more important 
to avoid the possibility of a zero outcome than to avoid a potential small, but non-zero, 
outcome. Although investing in gambles with a potential zero outcome might occur less 
frequently than opting for risky alternatives that yield at least small rewards, chimpanzees do 
occasionally engage in activities that bear the risk of receiving nothing. For example, when 
chimpanzees take part in solo and cooperative hunting activities, a hunt might not be successful 
or others might not share. Also, in the social domain, investing in social partners may bear the 
risk of getting nothing if others do not reciprocate. In captive settings, pairs of chimpanzees 
are willing to cooperate even when the distribution of rewards is unequal, i.e., when one partner 
gets more than the other (29, 30). Cooperation breaks down, however, if one partner can never 
profit (31, 32). Campbell and colleagues (33) recently showed that the same applies to groups 
of three chimpanzees (better paralleling the hunting scenario): they were willing to cooperate 
when two partners received 3 grapes and the third partner only received 1 grape, but 
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cooperation broke down when not every trial was rewarded with at least one piece of food for 
each partner.  
In the current study, we examined two aspects of chimpanzees’ risk preferences: First, we 
asked whether setting the value of the non-preferred outcome of a risky option to zero changes 
chimpanzees’ risk preferences relative to previous findings. Second, we tested whether 
individual risk preferences are stable across different methods of elicitation. In the first 
experiment, we followed the experimental procedure of Heilbronner and colleagues (19), but 
introduced the possibility of a zero outcome. In our task, chimpanzees chose between two 
cups–one of which (safe) always covered 3 pieces of food, while the other one (risky) covered 
either 6 pieces or 0 pieces of food with a 50/50 chance. This shift allowed us to compare 
chimpanzees’ risky choice when an unlucky gamble can lead to 1 (Heilbronner et al.) or 0 
(current study) pieces of food, and thus to assess whether chimpanzees’ risk-prone choice 
strategy holds even when they are presented with a gamble that includes the possibility of a 
zero outcome. If zero-outcome gambles affect risky choice differently than other gambles, we 
expect the chimpanzees in the current study to be more risk averse than chimpanzees in 
previous studies. We complemented this with a second experiment, where we applied a titration 
procedure to assess the average size of the safe option needed to change chimpanzees’ strategy 
from risk seeking to risk aversion and vice versa.  
 
Methods 
Subjects 
We tested 23 chimpanzees (11 male, 12 females, age range 12-35 years) from Ngamba Island 
Chimpanzee Sanctuary, Uganda (https://ngambaisland.org/). These are orphaned chimpanzees 
who were rescued from the illegal bushmeat and pet trade. Throughout the day the entire group 
(50 individuals) has access to a 95-acre secondary forest on the island to forage and roam 
freely. The group is additionally fed four times a day with fruits, vegetables, posho (maize flour 
dish), and porridge; water is available ad libitum. At night the chimpanzees sleep in a large 
holding facility (542 m3) consisting of nine rooms with interconnecting corridors or sliding 
doors. Testing took place in a familiar room in the holding facility. The chimpanzees were 
never food deprived for this study and could stop participating at any time by leaving the testing 
area and approaching the door to the forest. These chimpanzees frequently participate in 
cognitive-behavioral testing and are familiar with different experimental setups. They had 
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participated in another risk preference study four months prior to our data collection, which 
was conducted independently by another team of researchers. In this other study, a different 
method was used to assess attitudes to risk and uncertainty: reward magnitudes and the 
presentation procedure of risky choices differed from our study, and no results are available 
yet. The current research was approved by the University of Warwick research ethics 
committee, the Chimpanzee Sanctuary and Wildlife Conservation Trust (CSWCT) as well as 
the Uganda Wildlife Authority and the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology 
(UWA/COD/96/05). We did not conduct an a priori power analysis to determine sample size 
because we did not know how many subjects we would be able to test in the available time; 
our goal was to test as many chimpanzees as possible. 
 
Setup and General Procedure 
Chimpanzees were tested individually in their familiar sleeping rooms. The experimenter (E) 
presented two choice options hidden under two different cups on a table in front of the testing 
room (see Figure 1). The “safe” option always held three pieces of apple; the “risky” option 
either held six pieces of apple or none with a 50% chance of the cup being baited or empty. 
We chose these reward outcomes to equate the expected value of the risky and the safe option, 
thereby not potentially biasing the chimpanzees towards the option with a higher overall 
expected value. Apple is not part of the chimpanzees’ normal feeding regime on Ngamba 
Island. They can only get pieces of apple as rewards during experiments, and it is a highly 
attractive test treat. Our rewards were thus of similar value to the chimpanzees in the current 
study as were the half-grape rewards for the chimpanzees in Heilbronner et al.(19). 
We used two cups of different shape and colour as the safe and risky options. Assignment was 
the same for all chimpanzees: pink/shallow was the “risky cup”, and blue/tall was the “safe 
cup”.1 E baited the cups behind an occluder always starting on the left side and always 
manipulating both sides (even when the risky option was empty) such that the chimpanzee 
could not determine the amount and location of food items from monitoring E’s movement or 
noise.  
                                                 
1 We did not counterbalance cup assignment across chimpanzees because this experiment is part of a test battery 
to assess individual differences and it was important to provide all individuals with the same stimuli and order of 
conditions. All individuals, however, participated in numerical discrimination sessions and introductory trials 
before the test (see below). In the numerical discrimination trials, both cups sometimes contained the bigger (or 
smaller) amount, so that individuals were rewarded equally often for choosing both types of cups. All subjects 
passed this phase very quickly, indicating no bias for either cup when they have a clear preference.  
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Figure 1 General setup with covered safe option (blue/tall cup) and risky option 
(pink/shallow cup). Centers of the two plastic lids on which the options were presented were 
42 cm apart. 
 
A trial began when E lifted the occluder. After 4 seconds from trial onset, E pushed the table 
forward, and subjects had 15 seconds to indicate their choice by pointing to the cup (i.e., 
extending their fingers through the bars in front of the cup without reaching it) or by touching 
it. E only looked up when pushing the table forward and ignored all pointing signals which 
occurred before that moment. We used the first pointing signal after the table was fully 
extended towards the chimpanzee as the choice criterion. E ignored any prior pointing signals. 
When the chimpanzee had indicated their choice, E uncovered the chosen option while pulling 
back the table. If the choice yielded a food reward, E handed it to the chimpanzee and always 
revealed the other option (i.e. what is often called a full-feedback procedure, 34). In case the 
other option contained food, E visibly removed that food from the table before preparing the 
next trial. The next trial began immediately. The distance between the edge of the extended 
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table and the bars was varied depending on the individual chimpanzee’s finger reach and their 
tendency to grab the cups or table when within reach. 
 
Familiarization and test procedure 
The procedure consisted of a three-step familiarization phase and a test phase. Each subject 
received one session per day. For the familiarization and the test sessions in Exp. 1, we 
followed the procedure as described in (19). 
During the familiarization, we first assessed if subjects could reliably distinguish the relevant 
quantities presented during the test. These Numerical-Discrimination sessions consisted of 20 
trials each. Chimpanzees could see the food rewards for 4 seconds after the occluder was lifted. 
Then E covered the rewards with the appropriate cup (i.e., “safe cup” for 3 pieces and “risky 
cup” for 6 or 0 pieces) and pushed the table towards the subject. To pass the number-
discrimination test, chimpanzees had to choose the larger reward in eight of ten trials per 
combination (i.e., “3 vs. 0” and “3 vs. 6” pieces of food). The position of options was pseudo-
randomized to occur equally often on both sides of the table with no combination occurring 
more than three times in a row. Twenty-one chimpanzees passed the numerical discrimination 
after the first session. Only two individuals needed a second session.  
Second, we presented an Introductory session to familiarize the chimpanzees with the two 
different cups. This session consisted of 20 trials in which chimpanzees had only one option 
available. We presented the risky option ten times (five times with 6 pieces and five times 
empty) and the safe option ten times (always with 3 pieces). We pseudo-randomized order of 
the presented option and presentation side with no combination occurring more than twice in a 
row. No criterion had to be reached, and each chimpanzee received one Introductory session.  
Finally, we presented six Mixed sessions during which all trial types were presented. A Mixed 
session consisted of six Numerical-Discrimination trials, four Introductory trials and ten 
Choice trials where the chimpanzees could choose between the covered risky and safe options 
(note that Choice trials were identical to the test trials in Exp. 1 and served to familiarize the 
chimpanzees with this type of trial). Order of trials and presentation side was pseudo-
randomized with no more than three trials of the same type presented in a row. No criterion 
had to be reached, and each chimpanzee received six Mixed sessions. 
During the main test phase, each subject received sixty test trials, presented in three Test 
sessions with twenty choice trials each (Exp. 1). Each chimpanzee then participated in one 
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Titration session of twenty trials, during which the safe option changed as a function of the 
previous choice (Exp. 2). Test and titration sessions lasted approximately 10-12 minutes each 
and included ten choice trials where the risky cup was baited with six pieces of food and ten 
choice trials during which the risky cup was empty. In Exp. 2, we implemented a titration 
procedure where the size of the safe option was adjusted according to the choice in the previous 
trial. By using this titration protocol, we aimed at establishing an indifference point for each 
chimpanzee, i.e., the reward size at which each chimpanzee switches from risk seeking to risk 
aversion (and vice versa). In the titration trials, when E lifted the occluder, the risky option was 
always covered, but the safe option was visible at first (to allow the chimpanzee to take the 
current size of the safe option into account). After four seconds, E also covered the safe option 
and pushed the table forward for the subject to make their choice. If the chimpanzee chose the 
safe option, the safe option was reduced by one food item in the next trial. If the chimpanzee 
chose the risky option, the safe option was increased by one food item in the next trial (up to 
a maximum of 6 pieces). In Trial 1, the safe option consisted of the usual three pieces. The 
presentation side of the two options was pseudo-randomized with both options presented ten 
times on each side, and the content of the risky cup was also pseudo-randomized with the high 
(6) and low (0) outcome each occurring exactly five times on each side.  
 
Coding 
All trials were coded live by the experimenter. A second coder, who was blind to the hypothesis 
of the study, coded cup choice in 20% of the trials from videotape. Inter-rater reliability was 
perfect (N= 380 trials; 100% inter-observer agreement, Cohen’s κ = 1). 
 
Results 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, chimpanzees made 60 choices between a safe and a risky option, where they 
had a 50/50 chance of getting 6 vs. 0 rewards. An initial assessment of the data revealed a 
strong side bias in nine of the 23 tested chimpanzees, i.e., ~40% of the chimpanzees tested. We 
considered individuals to exhibit a side bias in a given test session if they chose the same side 
in at least 15 out of the 20 trials and categorized an individual as having a strong side bias when 
this happened in two or more test sessions. Consistently choosing one side resulted in equal 
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choice of the risky and safe option due to our counterbalancing of the two options. A side bias 
can be a sign of indifference to the presented options (in this case, indifference regarding the 
riskiness of the outcome) or an indicator that the chimpanzees had not learned the association 
between each cup (pink vs. blue) and the associated option (risky vs. safe). In the first case, the 
side bias would adequately reflect that an individual is neither particularly risk averse nor risk 
seeking. In the second case, however, it could mean that the choice pattern does not reveal an 
individual’s attitude towards risk, because the individual is unaware of the contingency 
between the cup and the reward outcome, and rather indicates that the individual fell back to a 
simplistic choice strategy. To account for the latter possibility, we additionally conducted our 
analyses on the subset of individuals who did not exhibit a side bias. A Shapiro test indicated 
that normality assumptions were violated for chimpanzees’ risky choice so we proceeded using 
nonparametric Wilcoxon tests to analyze the data.  
The full sample of chimpanzees (n = 23) chose the risky option on 41% of the trials on average 
and as a group tended to be risk averse as assessed by a Wilcoxon signed rank test (z = -1.79, 
p = .076, r = -0.37). The 14 unbiased chimpanzees chose the risky option on 34% of the trials 
(z = -1.82, p = .075, r = -0.49). Figure 2 shows individuals’ risky choices across the three test 
sessions. Notably, there was considerable variation ranging from one individual who almost 
always chose riskily across all three sessions to one individual who never chose riskily. We 
found no general pattern towards more risk seeking or risk aversion with increasing test 
experience for the group as a whole (see Supplementary Information). For results of the effect 
of age and sex, see Supplementary Information. No formal analysis was performed on the effect 
of rank on choice because this assessment is based on our and the animal keepers’ knowledge 
of the chimpanzees rather than systematic observational data. 
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Figure 2 Proportion of risky choice per individual per session in Exp. 1. Left: for the full 
sample; Right: for the subset with no side bias (i.e., excluding individuals who expressed 
a side bias in two or three sessions). Black lines/points represent mean per test session and 
95% confidence intervals.  
 
We were also interested in whether choice was affected by the outcome of previous risky 
choices. To this end we assessed if chimpanzees were more likely to choose the risky option 
when they had won (lost) in the previous risky choice, when this choice happened in the last 
(1-step-back) or penultimate (2-step-back) trial. The number of observations per individual in 
these subsets naturally differed because they depended on individual choices. We used 
generalized linear mixed models to analyze the data (35). Our full model included previous 
outcome (win/lose) as a fixed effect and subject ID as a random effect. To assess the effect of 
the previous outcome on choice in each trial we compared this to a null model only including 
the random effect. All models were fitted using the function glmer of the package lme4 (36).  
1-step-back analysis 
Following a risky choice in the previous trial, chimpanzees (n = 23) chose the risky option after 
a previous win (win-stay) on 24.7 ± 4.5% (here and in the following, 95% CI are reported) of 
trials, and, after a previous loss (lose-stay), 20.9 ± 6.2% of the time. They chose the safe option 
after a previous win (win-shift) on 23.0 ± 5.6% of the trials after a risky choice, and, after a 
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previous loss (lose-shift), 31.5 ± 8.5% of the time (see Table S2 for details of individual choice 
patterns). Overall, the outcome of a risky choice in the previous trial did not predict choice on 
subsequent trials (χ2 = 0.301, df = 1, p = .58, conditional R2 = 0.153).  
Following a risky choice in the previous trial, the unbiased chimpanzees (n = 14) chose the 
risky option after a previous win (win-stay) on 22.5 ± 7.4% of the trials and, after a previous 
loss (lose-stay), 17.3 ± 9.8% of the time. They chose the safe option after a previous win (win-
shift) on 23.8 ± 9.1% of all trials, and, after a previous loss (lose-shift), 36.5 ± 13.8% of the 
time Overall, the outcome of a risky choice in the previous trial did not predict choice on 
subsequent trials for the unbiased subset either (χ 2= 0.35, df = 1, p = .55, conditional R2 = 
0.277). 
We also conducted a Wilcoxon test for paired samples to see if overall chimpanzees were more 
likely to choose according to a “Win-Stay/Lose-Shift” strategy than a “Win-Shift/Lose-Stay” 
strategy. Chimpanzees (n = 23) used a Win-Stay/Lose-Shift strategy 56.2 ± 7.1% of the time 
and a Win-Shift/Lose-Stay strategy 43.8 ± 7.1% of the time which was not statistically 
significant (z = 1.41, p = .16, r = 0.29; see also Figure S1). The same pattern arose in the 
unbiased set: chimpanzees (n = 14) used a Win-Stay/Lose-Shift strategy 58.8 ± 11.2% of the 
time and a Win-Shift/Lose-Stay strategy 41.2 ± 11.2% of the time (z = 1.22, p = .24, r = 0.33). 
2-step-back analysis 
Following a risky choice in the penultimate trial, chimpanzees (n = 23) chose the risky option 
after a previous win (win-stay) on 21.2 ± 5.8% of the trials, and after a previous loss (lose-stay) 
21.9 ± 5.7% of the time. They chose the safe option after a previous win (win-shift) on about 
24.5 ± 6.2% of the trials, and, after a previous loss (lose-shift), 32.6 ± 7.8% of the time (see 
Table S3 for details of individual choice patterns). Overall, the outcome of a risky choice in 
the earlier trial did not predict choice behavior in the next trials (χ2 = 1.56, df = 1, p = .21, 
conditional R2 = 0.170).  
Following a risky choice in the penultimate trial, the unbiased chimpanzees (n = 14) chose the 
risky option after a previous win (win-stay) on 17.3 ± 9.3% of the trials, and after a previous 
loss (lose-stay) 19.5 ± 9.5% of the time. They chose the safe option after a previous win (win-
shift) on 26.5 ± 10.1% of the trials after, and, after a previous loss (lose-shift), 36.7 ± 13.1% of 
the time. Overall, the outcome of a risky choice in the earlier trial did not predict choice 
behavior in the next trials (χ 2= 0.394, df = 1, p = .53, conditional R2 = 0.318). 
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Again, we also looked whether the chimpanzees were more likely to choose according to a 
“Win-Stay/Lose-Shift” than a “Win-Shift/Lose-Stay” strategy but we did not find a significant 
difference between the two strategies. Chimpanzees (n = 23) used a Win-Stay/Lose-Shift 
strategy 53.6 ± 5.3% of the time and a Win-Shift/Lose-Stay strategy 46.4 ± 5.3% of the time 
(z = 1.40, p = 0.17, r = 0.29). In the unbiased set, chimpanzees (n = 14) used a Win-Stay/Lose-
Shift strategy 53.3 ± 8.5% of the time and a Win-Shift/Lose-Stay strategy 46.7 ± 8.5% of the 
time (z = 0.87, p = 0.41, r = 0.23). 
Taken together, these results are consistent with previous findings where chimpanzees did not 
show a Win-Stay/Lose-Shift strategy in risky-choice tasks (17, 18). Chimpanzees can, in 
principle, employ this strategy, as apparent in an experiment where they could repeatedly 
choose between two conspecific collaborators (37). However, they do not seem to base their 
risky choices on such a strategy. 
Experiment 2 
In Exp. 2, chimpanzees made 20 choices between a safe option and a risky option. The 
difference from Exp. 1 was that the size of the safe option was adjusted as a function of the 
individual’s previous choice. This titration procedure provided an additional measure for each 
individual’s risk preference: the size of the safe option that induced an individual switch to a 
risk-seeking/risk-avoiding choice. The average outcome of the risky option was always 3 
pieces (i.e., 6 or 0 pieces), and the initial safe outcome was 3 pieces of apple. Thus, an average 
safe option of more than 3 pieces indicates a risk-seeking individual, and an average of less 
than 3 pieces indicates a risk-averse individual.  
Initial assessment of the data revealed a side bias in five individuals, only two of whom had 
expressed a side bias in Exp. 1. This means that the majority of previously side-biased 
chimpanzees did not show a side bias in Exp. 2. Importantly, however, the numerical side-bias 
criterion (for a session of 20 trials this corresponds to choosing one side >= 15 times) might 
not be ideal given the experimental procedure of Exp. 2. This is because the average amount 
presented on each side as well as the number of relatively larger/smaller rewards on each side 
depended on the individual’s previous choices and was consequently not as consistently 
counterbalanced as in Exp. 1. Therefore, we decided to not treat these 5 individuals as 
classically side-biased and instead report results for the full sample. For assessment of the 
relationship between choice behaviour in Exp. 1 and Exp. 2, we additionally report results for 
the subset of individuals who had no side bias in Exp. 1. 
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The average size of the safe option across 20 trials was 3.1 ± 0.15 pieces for the full sample 
and 2.6 ± 0.17 pieces for the unbiased Exp. 1 subset. As in Exp. 1, the chimpanzees’ risk 
preferences varied widely across the spectrum, and the group as a whole cannot be easily 
classified as risk seeking or risk averse. The range of preferred safe options varied all the way 
from 0.9 to 5 pieces (see Table S4). To capture the degree of stability in individuals’ choices 
we measured the percentage of choices falling within a 1.5-point range around each individual 
mean of safe option size. We found that 85% of choices fell within this 1.5-point range (see 
Table S4 for more details). Figure 3 shows how the risky choice in Exp. 1 and the average size 
of the safe option in Exp. 2 were highly correlated (full sample: r = 0.41, z = 2.61, p = 0.009; 
unbiased subset: r = 0.5, z = 2.47, p = 0.013).  
 
 
Figure 3 Relationship between proportion of risky choices in Exp. 1 and average size of 
the safe option in Exp. 2. Left: for the full sample, Right: for the unbiased subset. 
 
Discussion 
Across two experiments we found less risk-seeking in chimpanzees compared to previous 
findings (10, 16-19). In Exp. 1, we employed the same basic paradigm that produced risk 
seeking in chimpanzees (19) with the crucial difference that the risky option had the possibility 
of yielding a zero outcome and not just a small reward. Whereas Heilbronner and colleagues 
(19) found that chimpanzees in their study chose the risky option in 64% of the trials when the 
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unlucky outcome was one piece of food, in the current study chimpanzees chose the risky 
option in only 41% and 34% (full sample and unbiased sample respectively) of the trials when 
the unlucky outcome was zero. Our results also differ from other previous findings, which were 
obtained with different methodologies, yet presented a picture of chimpanzees as being risk 
seeking across a range of different presentation procedures, outcome options, and social 
contexts (10, 16-18) For example, in Haun et al. (16), chimpanzees chose the risky option in 
100% of the trials when the size of the safe reward was small or medium and still in about 60% 
of the trials (as inferred from their Figure 2A) when the size of the safe reward was large. 
Rosati and Hare (10) showed that chimpanzees became even more risk prone after 
manipulating the social context. Specifically, they found that a competitive context (but not a 
playful one) made chimpanzees more risk prone compared to a neutral control condition, where 
the chimpanzees already picked the risky option in more than 60% of the trials. The option of 
getting nothing, in the current study, might have shifted chimpanzees’ preference towards 
playing it safe.  
In Exp. 2, we implemented a titration procedure where the amount of the safe option was 
adjusted according to the choice on the previous trial to obtain individual indifference points 
at which each chimpanzee switched between risk seeking and risk avoidance. The 
chimpanzees’ behavior in this titration task indicated mild risk aversion to risk neutrality – 
again a very different pattern compared to the clearly risk-seeking decisions of chimpanzees in 
previous studies. The significant correlation between results in Exp. 1 and Exp. 2 (see Figure 
3) indicates that both measures tap into the same underlying decision-making process. Those 
chimpanzees who were more likely to pick the safe option in Exp. 1 were the same ones that 
played it safer in Exp. 2 as indicated by their lower average size of the safe option, and, vice 
versa, those who were more likely to pick the risky option in Exp. 1 had a higher average size 
of the safe option in Exp. 2. 
Despite a general group trend towards risk avoidance in Exp. 1, we also found large individual 
differences in risky choice strategies. These differences were, on first sight, not systematic to 
obvious characteristics like age, sex, or rank, according to our knowledge of these chimpanzees 
and information from the keepers regarding dominance relationships in the group at the time 
of data collection. Future research may reveal if risk-taking strategies are related to other 
individual characteristics such as patience or curiosity, or perhaps to previous experience with 
experiment participation or other human interactions.  
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An issue worth considering further is that the procedure in Exp. 1 resulted in a strong side bias 
for several individuals. As discussed above, this could mean either that these individuals were 
indifferent to the riskiness of the presented options or that they lacked full comprehension of 
the consequences of choosing each of the cups. We were surprised by the relatively high 
number of individuals with a side-bias given that Heilbronner et al. (19) did not have a similar 
high proportion of side-biased individuals (4 of 5 chimpanzees preferred the risky option, and 
all 5 bonobos preferred the safe option, a result which precludes side-bias due to 
counterbalanced side presentation of both options). The correlation between Exp. 1 and 2 
clearly indicates that the current study consistently captured chimpanzees' risk preferences, 
which suggests that it was not a lack of comprehension that led to the side bias, but rather risk 
indifference. Other studies (10, 17, 18) have used different protocols, which allowed the 
inclusion of knowledge probes that directly tested for task understanding. For example, Rosati 
and Hare (17) always baited the safe option in full view of the chimpanzee and then presented 
a “risk outcome” container, which contained the range of possible risky outcome rewards (for 
example, a small and a large piece of food). Subjects knew that only one of the items would be 
hidden under the risky cup, but not which one. After the chimpanzee had inspected the risk 
outcome container, the risky option was baited hidden from the chimpanzee’s view. In order 
to succeed in comprehension trials, chimpanzees had to switch flexibly between risky and safe 
options as a function of trial type. For example, if the safe option contained two pieces of food 
and the risk outcome container contained two pieces of food ("comprehension-1" trials, see 
17), the rational choice was to go for the safe option because only one piece of food will be 
hidden during the baiting of the risky cup. Chimpanzees showed high success rates in those 
control trials, indicating that they did not struggle to comprehend the paradigm. Side bias was 
not an issue in our Exp. 2, where the chimpanzees were explicitly shown the current size of the 
safe option for each trial (as in Rosati and Hare, 17). 
The increased risk avoidance of at least some of the chimpanzees in our sample resembles the 
zero-avoidance strategy of pigeons in previous studies (1). Pisklak et al. (1) raise an interesting 
point in their discussion of a zero-avoidance effect in pigeons. When confronted with the zero-
outcome risky option, pigeons might treat the risky probabilistic reward as a variable delay to 
reward. Pisklak et al. (1) suggested that the risky choice with a zero outcome resembles a self-
control/temporal discounting task, where one can get an immediate small reward or a larger 
reward that sometimes occurs after a delay. Because pigeons show steep discounting functions 
in intertemporal choice tasks, this fits with the pigeons’ avoidance of possible delayed rewards. 
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The same might be true, though perhaps to a lesser extent (as chimpanzees do not show such 
steep temporal discounting functions, see for example (27)), for the chimpanzees tested in this 
study. Chimpanzees’ avoidance of the risky option may be related to the delayed larger reward 
delivery. It will be an interesting question to assess whether individual differences in zero-
avoidance (as indicated by a preference for the safe option in the current study) match the 
individual’s behavior in an intertemporal choice task: those individuals who are more impatient 
might show more zero-avoidance than those who are better able to delay of gratification. 
We have considered other explanations why chimpanzees in the current study were less risk-
seeking than chimpanzees in the majority of previous studies. One possibility is that our sample 
might differ systematically from previous samples in important aspects, such as housing 
conditions, rearing history or test experience. Our sample consisted of sanctuary-housed 
chimpanzees with an extensive history of cognitive-behavioral testing. Previous studies tested 
zoo-housed chimpanzees (16, 19) but also chimpanzees from another sanctuary population (10, 
17, 18) and all found similarly high levels of risk-seeking. The chimpanzees from these 
previous studies also had extensive history of cognitive-behavioural testing. Therefore, unless 
the chimpanzees from the two sanctuaries are very different, this seems an unlikely 
explanation. Furthermore, a recent study has shown that chimpanzees from our sample 
population and chimpanzees from the same zoo population tested by (19) and (16) performed 
similarly in intuitive statistical reasoning (38). In sum, we find it unlikely that our results are 
due to sample differences rather than a zero-outcome effect.  
Another possibility is that the lower total gain of our options compared to Heilbronner et al. 
(current study: 3 vs 0 and 3 vs 6; Heilbronner et al.: 4 vs 1 and 4 vs 7) might have shifted 
chimpanzees’ preferences toward risk aversion. However, this explanation does not fit well 
with the finding that various studies, which differed in how and which rewards were presented, 
consistently reported risk-seeking in chimpanzees. For example, Rosati and Hare (10) found a 
strong preference for risk-seeking when using different food qualities rather than magnitudes 
and Haun et al. (16) used different sizes of banana slices (1 large slice for risky option and 1 
small size for safe option – with the relative size of the safe option varying depending on 
condition) and also found risk-seeking preferences.  
This study contributes towards a fuller picture of understanding chimpanzee risky choice by 
showing that risk preferences are malleable and are likely influenced by extreme outcomes 
such as zero; at the same time, we found stability at the individual level when using two 
different measures. Our finding that a potential zero outcome might have a qualitatively 
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different standing than other small outcomes aligns with findings on chimpanzee behaviour in 
economic games where they acted like rational maximizers and accepted even the smallest 
offer as long as it was larger than nothing (39). The current results indicate that chimpanzees 
choose more carefully when a situation bears the risk of going empty-handed, whereas they are 
prone to gamble when they can take home at least one certain piece of food. Gilby and 
Wrangham (40) found that risk-prone hunting activities were observed more frequently in 
periods of low nutritional stress. It seems that chimpanzees in the wild do engage in activities 
of uncertain and potentially zero outcome, but they are more likely to do so when there is 
“insurance”: they do gamble, but only if they can’t go broke; otherwise they play it safe.  
Like chimpanzees, humans exhibit individual differences in their risk preferences and many 
factors influence how risk seeking we are (41). One of the key factors that influences how 
people make risky choices is how the information about the options is obtained (34, 42). For 
example, humans are typically risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses when asked in 
terms of explicitly described odds and outcomes, but this pattern can reverse when learning 
from experience (43-45). Although humans may be used to processing hypothetical and 
described information in the modern world, we also often fall back to more automatic and 
evolutionary ancient decision-making processes (46), which might be better captured when 
learning about risk by experience. Studying decision-making under uncertainty in nonhuman 
primates, and in particular knowing more about the malleability and stability of other great 
apes’ risk preferences, can help us understand the evolutionary roots of this aspect of human 
decision-making.  
Our sample size was large enough to observe considerable variation in individual risk 
propensities. On a theoretical level, this raises the question if talking about risk preference at 
the species level is a meaningful concept. In the same way that risk preference cannot be 
applied as a blanket statement to humans as a species–context, task format, and payoff 
structures matter– the same might be true for chimpanzees and other animals. 
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